Against Modal Realism form the Metaontological Point of View
Against Modal Realism form the Metaontological Point of View
复制标题
从元本体论角度反对模态实在论
DOI：
10.1007/s11406-017-9824-1
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Tora Koyama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
小山虎;河原正典;Tora Koyama
模态实在论是戴维·刘易斯（David Lewis）所熟悉的本体论立场，根据该立场，除了我们居住的实际世界之外，还存在可能的世界。坚持模态实在论是很困难的，事实上，模态实在论的拥护者也很少。然而，正如大多数当代形而上学家所同意的那样，这并不意味着可以轻易反驳模态实在论。在本文中，我从元本体论的角度反对模态实在论。首先，我根据刘易斯对模态实在论的讨论提供了模态实在论的精确表述。其次，我认为，除非模态实在论融入了一种被称为本体论实在论的元本体论观点，否则它就会受到损害。第三，我指出，如果模态实在论融入本体论实在论，它就会与其自身的表述发生冲突。
Modal realism is an ontological position made familiar by David Lewis, according to which there exist possible worlds other than the actual world that we inhabit. It is hard to uphold modal realism, and indeed modal realism has only a few advocates. However, as most contemporary metaphysicians agree, this does not mean that it is easy to refute modal realism. In this paper, I argue against modal realism from a metaontological point of view. First, I provide a precise formulation of modal realism based on Lewis’ discussion of modal realism. Second, I argue that modal realism is undermined unless it incorporates a view of metaontology known as ontological realism. Third, I point out that if modal realism incorporates ontological realism, it comes into conflict with its own formulation.