Template Attack Against AES in Counter Mode With Unknown Initial Counter
Template Attack Against AES in Counter Mode With Unknown Initial Counter
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DOI：
10.1109/ccwc57344.2023.10099238
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发表时间：
2023-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Marcial Tienteu;Edmund Smith;E. M. Santillan;Kevin T. Kornegay;Paige Harvey;Otily Toutsop;Tsion Yimer;Vinton Morris;K. Wandji
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Marcial Tienteu;Edmund Smith;E. M. Santillan;Kevin T. Kornegay;Paige Harvey;Otily Toutsop;Tsion Yimer;Vinton Morris;K. Wandji
尽管存在长期争议的可行性，许多应用程序仍然依赖于计数器模式的高级加密标准（AES）（AES-CTR）。研究支持从数学角度来看与CTR相关的漏洞，主要是伪造尝试，源于滥用nonce。当与加密算法配对时，假设没有随机数误用会增加解开CTR的复杂性。本文研究了CTR与AES-128的配对（AES-CTR）。它包括（1）利用模板攻击（TA）的AES-CTR的软件实现的全密钥恢复和（2）使用一阶分析和已知密钥来识别泄漏样本来增强TA分析的兴趣点（POI）。
Despite long-contested viability, numerous applications still rely upon Advance Encryption Standard (AES) in Counter mode (AES-CTR). Research supports that the vulnerabilities associated with CTR from a mathematical perspective, mainly forgery attempts, stem from misusing the nonce. When paired with cryptographic algorithms, assuming no nonce misuse increases the complexity of unraveling CTR. This paper examines the pairing of CTR with AES-128 (AES-CTR). It includes (1) full key recovery for a software implementation of AES-CTR utilizing a template attack (TA) and (2) enhancing the TA analysis's point of interest (POI) using first-order analysis and known key to identify leaky samples.