Acting for reasons: Reply to Dancy
Acting for reasons: Reply to Dancy
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行事原因：回复丹西
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Hyman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Hyman
本文认为，我们需要区分理性的两种不同概念：第一，前提或假设的概念，一个人的行动或思考可以从这个前提或假设进行；第二，当一个人以某种方式改变他的思想或行为时，他可以通过一个事实来指导他。进一步认为,如果我们有第一个想法,可以为p不管它的原因是,p,无论一个相信p。但是如果我们有第二个想法,一个人不能行动的原因,除非1知道p p。的最后一部分简要说明第二个主意的原因可以导致一个更大的争论,显示,最好是怀孕的知识作为一种能力作为一种信仰。
This paper argues that we need to distinguish between two different ideas of a reason: first, the idea of a premise or assumption, from which a person’s action or deliberation can proceed; second, the idea of a fact by which a person can be guided, when he modifies his thought or behaviour in some way. It argues further that if we have the first idea in mind, one can act for the reason that p regardless of whether it is the case that p, and regardless of whether one believes that p. But if we have the second idea in mind, one cannot act for the reason that p unless one knows that p. The last part of the paper briefly indicates how the second idea of a reason can contribute to a larger argument, showing that it is better to conceive of knowledge as a kind of ability than as a kind of belief.