Can international environmental cooperation be bought: Comment
Can international environmental cooperation be bought: Comment
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国际环保合作可以买吗：评论
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2011.08.005
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
N. Glanemann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Glanemann
Fuentes-Albero和鲁比奥（2010）分析了国家异质性对国际环境合作的影响。它们考虑了两类国家，一类国家的减排成本不同，另一类国家的环境损害也不同。此外，还分析了自筹资金转移支付制度是否能消除这些异质性效应。该文件表明，这两种情况下的不对称和没有转让的最大合作水平包括三个国家的同一类型。对于环境损害的异质性，Fuentes-Albero和鲁比奥得出结论，鉴于损害的差异不是很大，第一类国家和第二类国家之间的协议也是自我执行的。在这篇评论中，最后提到的结果的推导是不正确的，证明了这个联盟是不自我执行。
Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) analytically examine the effects of the countries’ heterogeneity on the international environmental cooperation. They consider two types of countries having different abatement costs in one case and different environmental damages in another case. Furthermore it is analyzed whether a self-financed transfer system can diminish these heterogeneity effects. The paper shows for both scenarios of asymmetry and no transfers that the maximum level of cooperation consists of three countries of the same type. For the case of heterogeneity in environmental damages, Fuentes-Albero and Rubio conclude that an agreement between one type 1 and one type 2 country is also self-enforcing given that the differences in the damages are not very large. In this comment, the derivation of the last mentioned result is shown to be incorrect by proving that this coalition is not self-enforcing.