A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.dam.2005.10.006
复制
发表时间：
2006-04
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Fujishige;A. Tamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Fujishige;A. Tamura
在双边匹配市场理论中，有两个标准模型：（i）Gale和Shapley的婚姻模型;（ii）Shapley和Shubik的分配模型。最近，Eriksson和Karlander引入了一个混合模型，该模型被Sotomayor进一步推广。在本文中，我们提出了一个共同的推广，这些模型利用的离散凸分析的Murota介绍的框架，并验证了存在一个成对稳定的结果，在我们的一般模型。
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two standard models: (i) the marriage model due to Gale and Shapley and (ii) the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik. Recently, Eriksson and Karlander introduced a hybrid model, which was further generalized by Sotomayor. In this paper, we propose a common generalization of these models by utilizing the framework of discrete convex analysis introduced by Murota, and verify the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome in our general model.