Implicature, Inference and Cancellability
Implicature, Inference and Cancellability
复制标题
含义、推论和可撤销性
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Michael Haugh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Michael Haugh
迄今为止，语用学的标准立场一直是，可取消性是区分含义与逻辑含义、语义蕴涵等的有用方法。然而，近年来，在语言语用学家和语言哲学家中，关于含意是否总是可取消的，或者它们是否真的是可取消的，有相当多的争论。在本章中，我们认为可取消性包括一系列行为，这些行为以不同的方式发挥作用，这取决于我们是在分析能够导致含义的推理还是分析含义本身。通过这种方式，我们可以看到分析家们是如何在这样的争论中经常低估推理的偶然性以及隐含的内在不确定性的。最后得出结论，可取消性应该是进一步的语义驱动的分析，以提供一个坚实的基础，为理论的含义。
The standard position in pragmatics to date has been that cancellability is useful way of differentiating implicatures from logical implications, semantic entailments and the like. In recent years, however, there has been considerable debate as to whether implicatures are in fact always cancellable, or indeed whether they are cancellable at all, amongst linguistic pragmaticians and language philosophers. In this chapter, it is suggested that cancellability encompasses a range of actions that play out in different ways depending on whether we are analysing inferences that can lead to implicatures or the implicatures themselves. In this way, we can see how analysts have often underplayed the contingency of inferences as well as the inherent indeterminacy of implicatures in such debates. It is concluded that cancellability should be the subject of further empirically-driven analyses in order to provide a solid foundation for the theorization of implicature.