Inequality and the Emergence of Vigilante Organizations: The Case of Mexican Autodefensas
Inequality and the Emergence of Vigilante Organizations: The Case of Mexican Autodefensas
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不平等与自卫组织的出现：墨西哥自卫队案例
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. J. Phillips
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. J. Phillips
如何解释民团组织的出现？在世界各地，出现了私刑分子，非法惩罚被认为是罪犯的人，往往导致严重后果。然而，文献对这一现象提出了部分和相互矛盾的解释。本文认为，当地的经济不平等创造了一个成熟的民团组织的情况。不平等造成了对私刑的需求，因为与在私人和公共安全方面具有优势的富裕邻居相比，较贫穷的公民感到相对缺乏安全。此外，不平等意味着劳动力的雇主和工人分配，这是组织一种特殊类型的团体的理想选择，即赞助人资助的义务警员团体。实证检验使用了2013年墨西哥民团组织浪潮的原始数据，这些组织存在于墨西哥32个联邦实体中的13个。家庭层面的收入不平等与有组织的治安维持密切相关。较少的支持被发现竞争的解释。
What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the world, vigilantes emerge to illegally punish perceived criminals, often leading to serious consequences. However, the literature presents partial and conflicting explanations for this phenomenon. This article argues that local economic inequality creates a situation ripe for vigilante organizations. Inequality creates demand for vigilantism because poorer citizens feel relatively deprived of security compared with wealthier neighbors who have advantages regarding private and public security. In addition, inequality suggests a patron-and-worker distribution of labor, and this is ideal for organizing a particular type of group, the patron-funded vigilante group. Empirical tests use original data on the 2013 wave of Mexican vigilante organizations, present in 13 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities. Municipal-level income inequality is robustly associated with organized vigilantism. Less support is found for competing explanations.
不平等、不满和内战
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
Cederman Lars-Erik
通讯作者：
Cederman Lars-Erik