Political competitition and multiparty coalition governments
Political competitition and multiparty coalition governments
复制标题
政治竞争和多党联合政府
DOI：
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Schofield
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Schofield
抽象的。先前对多党联盟行为的许多理论分析要么基于一维政策模型，要么基于常和博弈解释。出于理论和实证原因，本文重点关注竞争性二维模型。在这种模式中，政党关心政策结果，但选择政党立场时既考虑到选举结果，又作为联合谈判的基础。政治核心被提议为一组可能的联盟结果。心脏要么是政治博弈的核心，要么是由少数党派立场决定的。在某些条件下，可以证明政党立场选择存在均衡。该模型表明，政党可以分为强核心政党或弱核心政党、反核心政党或外围政党。这种政党分类隐含着政党制度的类型学，这为战后许多欧洲国家出现少数派、最小获胜和剩余联盟提供了一定的理论基础。
Abstract. Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been based either on a one-dimensional policy model or on a constant-sum game interpretation. For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two-dimensional model. In this model parties are concerned with policy outcomes but choose party positions both with a view to electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political heart is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The heart is either the core of the political game or is determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions an equilibrium in the choice of party positions can be shown to exist. The model suggests that parties can be categorized as either strong or weak core parties, anti-core parties or peripheral parties. This categorization of parties implies a typology of party systems, which gives some theoretical foundation for the occurrence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many of the European countries in the postwar period.