The Myth of Harmless Wrongs in Moral Cognition: Automatic Dyadic Completion From Sin to Suffering
The Myth of Harmless Wrongs in Moral Cognition: Automatic Dyadic Completion From Sin to Suffering
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DOI：
10.1037/a0036149
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发表时间：
2014-08-01
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Ward, Adrian F.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gray, Kurt;Schein, Chelsea;Ward, Adrian F.
当事情出错时，有人会受到伤害。这一假设源于二元道德理论，它提出了一个道德认知模板的不法行为者和受害者（即。例如，受害者）。这种二元模板意味着无受害者的错误（e。例如，在一个实施例中，手淫）在心理上是不完整的，迫使心灵感知受害者，即使他们客观上不存在。五项研究表明，二元完成自动和隐含发生：表面上无害的错误被认为有受害者（研究1），激活伤害的概念（研究2和3），并增加痛苦的看法（研究4和5）。这些结果表明，感知不道德的伤害是直观的，不需要努力合理化。这种解释既反对道德困惑的标准解释，也反对假设无害错误的心理存在的特定领域道德理论。二元完成还表明，道德困境中的错误（道义论）和伤害（功利主义）的冲突是典型的道德认知的代表。
When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i. e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e. g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have victims (Study 1), activate concepts of harm (Studies 2 and 3), and increase perceptions of suffering (Studies 4 and 5). These results suggest that perceiving harm in immorality is intuitive and does not require effortful rationalization. This interpretation argues against both standard interpretations of moral dumbfounding and domain-specific theories of morality that assume the psychological existence of harmless wrongs. Dyadic completion also suggests that moral dilemmas in which wrongness (deontology) and harm (utilitarianism) conflict are unrepresentative of typical moral cognition.