Airport deregulation: Effects on pricing and capacity
Airport deregulation: Effects on pricing and capacity
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.09.002
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发表时间：
2008-07-01
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Basso, Leonardo J.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Basso, Leonardo J.
我们使用两个拥挤的机场和航空公司寡头垄断之间的垂直关系模型，从分析和数值角度研究放松管制如何影响机场的价格和容量。我们发现：（i）不受监管的利润最大化机场会因拥堵外部性而收取过高的费用，并且与最佳方案相比，会导致巨大的配置效率低下和无谓损失。它们会限制产能投资，但总体而言，会减少延误； (ii) 在成本回收的前提下实现福利最大化表现得相当好，达到了与不受监管的私人机场类似的拥堵水平，但不会引起如此大的交通收缩；这给私人机场放松管制的可取性打了一个问号； (iii) 航空公司和机场之间加强合作带来了一些改善，但由此产生的机场定价策略导致了下游航空公司卡特尔； (iv) 当航班延误成本影响较强且航空公司差异化较弱时，由一家航空公司主导机场可能是最佳选择，但只有当机场的定价方案使航空公司数量与竞争无关时，这种情况才会发生。 2007 Elsevier B.V. 保留所有权利。
We use a model of vertical relations between two congestible airports and an airline oligopoly to examine, both analytically and numerically, how deregulation may affect airports prices and capacities. We find that: (i) unregulated profit-maximizing airports would overcharge for the congestion externality and, compared to the first-best, would induce large allocative inefficiencies and dead-weight losses. They would restrict capacity investments but, overall, would induce fewer delays; (ii) Welfare maximization subject to cost recovery performs quite well, achieving congestion levels similar to a private-unregulated airport but without inducing such large traffic contraction; this puts a question mark on the desirability of deregulation of private airports; (iii) Increased cooperation between airlines and airports provides some improvements, but the resulting airport pricing strategy leads to a downstream airline cartel; (iv) When schedule delay costs effects are strong and airline differentiation is weak, it may be optimal to have a single airline dominating the airports, but this happens only when airports' pricing schemes render the number of airlines irrelevant for competition. 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.