Does Model Uncertainty Justify Conservatism? Robustness and the Delegation of Monetary Policy
Does Model Uncertainty Justify Conservatism? Robustness and the Delegation of Monetary Policy
复制标题
模型的不确定性是否证明了保守主义的合理性？
DOI：
10.2202/1935-1690.1564
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Peter Tillmann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Peter Tillmann
本文分析了当相对于经济基本模型的错误指定而言，最优政策的鲁棒性偏好时，将货币政策委托给厌恶通胀的央行行长的理由。我们使用一个简单的新凯恩斯主义模型来展示央行目标函数中的最优产出缺口权重如何取决于模型的不确定性程度。特别是，我们通过数字表明，即使央行担心政策在模型错误指定方面的稳健性，任命保守派央行的理由仍然占上风。此外，我们发现，如果不确定性程度增加，央行应该更加重视通胀稳定。有趣的是，如果不确定性很大，即使没有冲击持续性，货币政策也应该委托给保守的央行行长。
This paper analyzes the rationale for delegating monetary policy to an inflation-averse central banker when there is a preference for robustness of optimal policy with respect to misspecifications of the underlying model of the economy. We use a simple New Keynesian model to show how the optimal output gap weight in the central bank's objective function depends on the degree of model uncertainty. In particular, we show numerically that the rationale for appointing a conservative central bank prevails even if the central bank is concerned about the robustness of policy with respect to model misspecifications. Moreover, we find that the central bank should put more relative weight on inflation stabilization if the degree of uncertainty increases. Interestingly, if the degree of uncertainty is large, monetary policy should be delegated to a conservative central banker even in the absence of shock persistence.