Device-independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks
Device-independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks
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DOI：
10.1088/1367-2630/11/4/045021
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发表时间：
2009-04-01
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Scarani, Valerio
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pironio, Stefano;Acin, Antonio;Scarani, Valerio
与设备无关的量子密钥分发（DIQKD）是对通常量子密钥分发（QKD）中所作安全假设的一种放松。与通常的QKD一样，DIQKD的安全性遵循量子物理定律，但与通常的QKD相反，它不依赖于对协议中使用的量子设备的内部工作的任何假设。在本文中，我们详细介绍了Acin et al . （2008 Phys.）中引入的DIQKD协议的安全性证明。Rev. Lett. 98 230501)。这个证明利用了量子理论的完整结构（与只利用无信号原则的其他证明相反），但只适用于集体攻击，在集体攻击中，假定窃听者在每一轮协议中独立且相同地对诚实方的量子系统起作用（尽管她可以在任何时候对她的系统采取一致的行动）。任何DIQKD协议的安全性都必须依赖于贝尔不等式的违背。我们在此背景下讨论贝尔实验的漏洞问题。
Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) represents a relaxation of the security assumptions made in usual quantum key distribution (QKD). As in usual QKD, the security of DIQKD follows from the laws of quantum physics, but contrary to usual QKD, it does not rely on any assumptions about the internal working of the quantum devices used in the protocol. In this paper, we present in detail the security proof for a DIQKD protocol introduced in Acin et al (2008 Phys. Rev. Lett. 98 230501). This proof exploits the full structure of quantum theory (as opposed to other proofs that exploit only the no-signaling principle), but only holds against collective attacks, where the eavesdropper is assumed to act on the quantum systems of the honest parties independently and identically in each round of the protocol (although she can act coherently on her systems at any time). The security of any DIQKD protocol necessarily relies on the violation of a Bell inequality. We discuss the issue of loopholes in Bell experiments in this context.