Measuring BGP Route Origin Registration and Validation
Measuring BGP Route Origin Registration and Validation
复制标题
测量 BGP 路由源注册和验证
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-15509-8_3
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Bush
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Daniele Iamartino;C. Pelsser;R. Bush
BGP是一种事实上的域间路由协议，在设计时没有考虑安全性。最近，网络运营商经历了其网络前缀的劫持，通常是由于其他运营商的BGP错误配置，有时是恶意的。为了解决这一问题，提出并开发了基于RPKI基础设施的前缀来源验证。今天，许多组织正在RPKI中注册他们的数据，以保护他们的前缀免受意外的错误起源。然而，有些组织向RPKI存储库提交了不正确的信息，或者宣布了与他们注册的不完全匹配的前缀。此外，互联网登记处的RPKI储存库在操作上也不可靠。这项工作的目的是通过测量来揭示这些问题。我们展示了它们的重要性，试图了解错误的主要原因，并探索可能的解决方案。在这项纵向研究中，我们看到的影响，丢弃路由公告与无效的起源将对路由表的政策，并在较小程度上在一个大型的研究网络的边缘的流量。
BGP, the de-facto inter-domain routing protocol, was designed without considering security. Recently, network operators have experienced hijacks of their network prefixes, often due to BGP misconfiguration by other operators, sometimes maliciously. In order to address this, prefix origin validation, based on a RPKI infrastructure, was proposed and developed. Today, many organizations are registering their data in the RPKI to protect their prefixes from accidental mis-origination. However, some organizations submit incorrect information to the RPKI repositories or announce prefixes that do not exactly match what they registered. Also, the RPKI repositories of Internet registries are not operationally reliable. The aim of this work is to reveal these problems via measurement. We show how important they are, try to understand the main causes of errors, and explore possible solutions. In this longitudinal study, we see the impact of a policy which discards route announcements with invalid origins would have on the routing table, and to a lesser extent on the traffic at the edge of a large research network.