Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory
Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014
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发表时间：
2017-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
De Neys, Wim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bago, Bence;De Neys, Wim
有影响力的人类思维双过程模型假设推理者通常会产生快速、直观的启发式（即第1型）反应，随后可能会被较慢的深思熟虑的处理（即第2型）所覆盖和纠正。在本研究中，我们直接检验了这一时间过程假设。我们使用了两种反应模式，参与者必须立即给出答案，然后在给出最终答案之前有额外的时间。在四个实验中，我们使用了一系列程序（例如，挑战响应截止日期，并发负载）来淘汰类型2处理，并确保初始响应本质上是直观的。我们的主要发现是，我们经常观察到正确的、合乎逻辑的反应是第一种、直接的反应。响应置信度和延迟分析表明，这些初始正确的响应是快速的，具有高置信度，并且面对冲突的启发式响应。研究结果表明，快速和自动的1型处理也从一开始就提示了正确的逻辑反应。我们提出了一个修正的双过程模型，其中不同类型直觉的相对强度决定推理性能。(C) 2016 Elsevier B.V.版权所有
Influential dual process models of human thinking posit that reasoners typically produce a fast, intuitive heuristic (i.e., Type-1) response which might subsequently be overridden and corrected by slower, deliberative processing (i.e., Type-2). In this study we directly tested this time course assumption. We used a two response paradigm in which participants have to give an immediate answer and afterwards are allowed extra time before giving a final response. In four experiments we used a range of procedures (e.g., challenging response deadline, concurrent load) to knock out Type 2 processing and make sure that the initial response was intuitive in nature. Our key finding is that we frequently observe correct, logical responses as the first, immediate response. Response confidence and latency analyses indicate that these initial correct responses are given fast, with high confidence, and in the face of conflicting heuristic responses. Findings suggest that fast and automatic Type 1 processing also cues a correct logical response from the start. We sketch a revised dual process model in which the relative strength of different types of intuitions determines reasoning performance. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.