Do some outside directors play a political role?

Do some outside directors play a political role?
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DOI:
10.1086/320271
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发表时间:
2001-04-01
影响因子:
2.2
通讯作者:
Knoeber, CR
Knoeber, CR
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Agrawal, A;Knoeber, CR

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如果有政治和法律背景的外部董事扮演政治角色,他们在政治更重要的公司的董事会中将更加重要。我们进行了三个测试,第一,制造业公司的样本。我们发现,有政治经验的董事在对政府的销售、出口和游说更大的公司中更普遍;律师董事在环境监管成本更高的公司中更普遍;两者在较大的公司中更普遍。第二,在20世纪90年代,当零售竞争的到来使政治变得更加重要时,我们发现有政治经验的董事的发生率增加了。最后,我们探讨是否政府口味的多样性创造了女性董事的政治角色。尽管我们记录了女性董事的发生率随着时间的推移而增加,但我们几乎没有发现女性董事发挥政治作用的证据。
If outside directors with backgrounds in politics and in law play a political role, they will be more important on the boards of firms for which politics matters more. We conduct three tests, First, for a sample of manufacturing firms. we find that politically experienced directors are more prevalent in firms where sales to government, exports, and lobbying are greater; lawyer-directors are more prevalent in firms where costs of environmental regulation are higher; and both are more prevalent in larger firms. Second, for a sample of electric utilities during the 1990s, when the advent of retail competition made politics more important, we find increased incidence of politically experienced directors. Finally, we explore whether a governmental taste for diversity creates a political role for women directors. Although we document increased incidence of women directors over time, we find little evidence that women directors play a political role.