Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule‐Making in the Public Interest
Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule‐Making in the Public Interest
复制标题
会计中的责任？公共利益中的私人规则制定的政治
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00282.x
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Tim Büthe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Mattli;Tim Büthe
近几十年来，各国政府越来越多地将国内和国际监管职能下放给私营部门代理。本文考察了这种委托的原因以及私人代理人与公共代理人的区别，并分析了监管岗位委托的政治学。它认为，委托给公共机构和委托给私人机构之间的关键区别在于，在后一种情况下，出现了与文献中通常考虑的问题本质上不同的多重委托人问题。代理人的行为将由相互竞争的委托-代理关系的相对紧密程度决定。这种紧密性是每个委托人对代理人的财务和经营能力及其在制定规则方面的有效性的相对重要性的函数。此外，文章认为，宏观政治气候的外生变化会深刻影响委托-代理关系的性质。两位作者通过对美国会计准则制定的研究，检验了他们关于后授权时期监管政治的假设，这是一个将监管权下放给私人代理的案例，该案例可以追溯到新政时代，在最近的企业财务丑闻之后，重新受到了公众的关注。
Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent's action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principal–agent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal for the agent's financial and operational viability as well as its effectiveness in rule making. Further, the article posits that exogenous changes in the macro-political climate can deeply affect the nature of principal–agent relationships. The authors test their hypotheses about the politics of regulation in the postdelegation period through the study of accounting standards setting in the United States, a case of delegation of regulatory authority to a private agent that goes back to the New Deal era and has received renewed public attention in the wake of recent corporate financial scandals.