The effects of anti-takeover measures on Japanese corporations
The effects of anti-takeover measures on Japanese corporations
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DOI：
10.1007/s11156-013-0361-0
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发表时间：
2014-05
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Tsung-ming Yeh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tsung-ming Yeh
本研究调查了2005年至2007年期间宣布并采取预警反收购措施的130家日本企业。与管理防御假说一致，公告相关的异常收益率为负，并具有统计显著性。对异常收益率与公司股权结构之间关系的研究也支持信号传递假说。当管理层持股变量从接近零到中间水平时，异常收益与管理层持股变量正相关;然而，当管理层持股超过中间水平时，异常收益与管理层持股变量负相关。然而，进一步检查后采用的经营业绩显示没有显着的趋势恶化，是预测的管理防御假说。研究结果初步支持信号假说：日本管理者采取反收购措施主要是为了阻止敌意收购，反收购措施本身并不从根本上影响管理者的行为。
This study examines 130 Japanese firms that announced and adopted pre-warning anti-takeover measures between 2005 and 2007. Consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, the announcement-associated abnormal returns are negative and statistically significant. An examination of the relationship between the abnormal returns and the firm’s ownership structure also supports the signaling hypothesis. The abnormal returns are positively related to the managerial shareholding variable as the managerial shareholding variable ranges from near-zero to an intermediate level; however, the relationship becomes negative as managerial shareholding increases past intermediate levels. Nevertheless, further examination of the post-adoption operating performance shows no significant trend towards deterioration as is predicted by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. The results primarily support the signaling hypothesis: Japanese managers adopt anti-takeover measures mainly to deter hostile takeovers, and the anti-takeover measures, per se, do not fundamentally affect managerial behaviors.