Congressional distributive politics and state economic performance
Congressional distributive politics and state economic performance
复制标题
国会分配政治与州经济绩效
DOI：
10.1023/a:1018341713887
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Poterba
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Levitt;J. Poterba
在1953年至1990年期间，由非常资深的民主党国会议员代表的州比由更初级的国会代表团代表的州增长得更快。拥有大量政治竞争性众议院选区的州的增长速度也高于平均水平。第一个发现与传统的基于立法者的分配政治模式相一致，第二个发现与党派模式相一致。我们无法发现资历、州政治竞争和联邦资金的地理分布之间有任何实质性的重要联系，因此更高的地区特定联邦支出似乎不是州经济增长和国会代表性之间联系的来源。
States that were represented by very senior Democratic congressmen grew more quickly during the 1953–1990 period than states that were represented by more junior congressional delegations. States with a large fraction of politically competitive House districts also grew faster than average. The first finding is consistent with traditional legislator-based models of distributive politics, the second with partisan models. We cannot detect any substantively important association between seniority, state political competition, and the geographic distribution of federal funds, so higher district- specific federal spending does not appear to be the source of the link between state economic growth and congressional representation.