ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NPDES INSPECTIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NPDES INSPECTIONS
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联邦制下的环境保护：NPDES 检查的政治经济学
DOI：
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发表时间：
1998
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Eric A. Helland
中科院分区：
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作者：
Eric A. Helland
本文探讨了监管权力下放给地方官员的后果。该研究评估了三个假设的作用，授权在监管政策的实施：（1）联邦的情况下，预测授权没有效果;（2）州/地方模型预测，授权，事实上，退位;（3）全面影响模型预测，双方的利益决定如何实施环境政策。结果提供的证据表明，虽然授权并没有完全消除国家政策制定者改变监管政策的能力，但它确实允许地方利益改变国家标准。版权所有1998年由牛津大学出版社。
This paper examines the consequences of the delegation of regulatory authority to local officials. The study evaluates three hypotheses of the role delegation plays in the implementation of regulatory policy: (1) the federal case, which predicts that delegation has no effect; (2) the state/local model predicts that delegation is, in fact, abdication; and (3) the full impact model predicts that both interests determine how environmental policy is implemented. The results provide evidence that, while delegation does not completely remove national policymaker ability to alter regulatory policy, it does allow local interests to alter national standards. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.