Evolutionary forwarding games in Delay Tolerant Networks
Evolutionary forwarding games in Delay Tolerant Networks
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发表时间：
2010-07
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通讯作者：
R. E. Azouzi;F. Pellegrini;Vijay Kamble
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作者：
R. E. Azouzi;F. Pellegrini;Vijay Kamble
将进化博弈应用于延迟容忍网络(DTN)的非合作转发控制。我们的研究集中在使用两跳路由的DTN中将消息从源传递到目的地的概率。我们推导出了成功概率作为在大量移动设备中的竞争的函数。具体地，对于由源产生的每个消息，每个移动台可以做出涉及移动台参与中继的策略的决定。如果第一个将分组的副本递送到目的地，则参与的移动电话将获得单位奖励。引入效用函数作为报酬单位与能源成本之差。我们展示了相互接触时间、能量消耗和定价特征对演化动力学和均衡行为(称为演化稳定策略-ESS)的影响。我们还专门分析了信源可能引入的机制，以便在给定的最后期限内以很高的概率将消息传递到目的地。
In this paper, we apply evolutionary games to non-cooperative forwarding control of Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN). We focus our study on the probability to deliver a message from source to destination in a DTN using two-hop routing. We derive the success probability as a function of the competition within a large population of mobiles. In particular, for each message generated by a source, each mobile may take a decision that concerns the strategy by which the mobile participates to the relaying. A mobile that participates receives a unit of reward if it is the first to deliver a copy of the packet to the destination. A utility function is introduced as the difference between a reward unit and the energy cost. We show how the evolution dynamics and the equilibrium behavior (called Evolutionary Stable Strategy — ESS) are influenced by the characteristics of inter contact time, energy expenditure and pricing characteristics. We specialize our analysis also to mechanisms that the source may introduce in order to have the message delivered to the destination with high probability within a given deadline.