Escaping the Confines of Time: Continuous Browser Extension Fingerprinting Through Ephemeral Modifications
Escaping the Confines of Time: Continuous Browser Extension Fingerprinting Through Ephemeral Modifications
复制标题
逃离时间的限制:通过短暂修改进行连续浏览器扩展指纹识别
DOI:
10.1145/3548606.3560576
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发表时间:
2022
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Polakis, Jason
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Solomos, Konstantinos;Ilia, Panagiotis;Nikiforakis, Nick;Polakis, Jason
Browser fingerprinting continues to proliferate across the web. Critically, popular fingerprinting libraries have started incorporating extension-fingerprinting capabilities, thus exacerbating the privacy loss they can induce. In this paper we propose continuous fingerprinting, a novel extension fingerprinting technique that captures a critical dimension of extensions' functionality that allowed them to elude all prior behavior-based techniques. Specifically, we find that ephemeral modifications are prevalent in the extension ecosystem, effectively rendering such extensions invisible to prior approaches that are confined to analyzing snapshots that capture a single moment in time. Accordingly, we develop Chronos, a system that captures the modifications that occur throughout an extension's life cycle, enabling it to fingerprint extensions that make transient modifications that leave no visible traces at the end of execution. Specifically, our system creates behavioral signatures that capture nodes being added to or removed from the DOM, as well as changes being made to node attributes. Our extensive experimental evaluation highlights the inherent limits of prior snapshot-based approaches, as Chronos is able to identify 11,219 unique extensions, increasing coverage by 66.9% over the state of the art. Additionally, we find that our system captures a unique modification event (i.e., mutation) for 94% of the extensions, while also being able to resolve 97% of the signature collisions across extensions that affect existing snapshot-based approaches. Our study more accurately captures the extent of the privacy threat presented by extension fingerprinting, which warrants more attention by privacy-oriented browser vendors that, up to this point, have focused on deploying countermeasures against other browser fingerprinting vectors.
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
2022
期刊:
USENIX Security Symposium
影响因子:
--
作者:
Solomos, K.;Ilia, P.;Karami, S.;Nikiforakis, N.;Polakis, J.
通讯作者:
Polakis, J.
DOI:
10.1109/sp40001.2021.00017
发表时间:
2020-08
期刊:
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
影响因子:
--
作者:
Umar Iqbal;Steven Englehardt;Zubair Shafiq
通讯作者:
Umar Iqbal;Steven Englehardt;Zubair Shafiq
影响因子:
--
作者:
V. Rizzo;S. Traverso;M. Mellia
通讯作者:
M. Mellia
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2018
期刊:
USENIX Security Symposium
影响因子:
--
作者:
Antoine Vastel;Pierre Laperdrix;Walter Rudametkin;Romain Rouvoy
通讯作者:
Romain Rouvoy
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
Proceedings of the Web Conference (WWW
影响因子:
--
作者:
Starov, Oleksii;Laperdrix, Pierre;Kapravelos, Alexandros;Nikiforakis, Nick
通讯作者:
Nikiforakis, Nick