Contracts as Investment Barriers in Unlicensed Spectrum
Contracts as Investment Barriers in Unlicensed Spectrum
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DOI：
10.1109/infocom.2018.8485810
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发表时间：
2018-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yining Zhu;R. Berry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yining Zhu;R. Berry
由于无需昂贵的许可证，免许可频谱降低了企业提供无线服务的门槛。然而，现有企业可能仍会试图设置其他进入壁垒。例如，近期的研究强调了客户合同如何可能被用作一种此类壁垒，即通过对转用新进入者的客户进行惩罚。然而，这项研究没有考虑到免许可频谱的另一个潜在益处，即能够使用这种开放资源可能会激励新进入者投资于新的且可能更好的技术。本文研究了合同以及企业投资开发新技术的激励之间的相互作用。我们使用一个博弈论模型来研究这一问题，并描述合同对经济福利的影响。还考虑了社会规划者提供补贴或征税的作用。
By not requiring expensive licenses, unlicensed spectrum lowers the barriers for firms to offer wireless services. However, incumbent firms may still try to erect other entry barriers. For example, recent work has highlighted how customer contracts may be used as one such barrier by penalizing customers for switching to a new entrant. However, this work did not account for another potential benefit of unlicensed spectrum, having access to this open resource may incentivize entrants to invest in new and potentially better technology. This paper studies the interaction of contracts and the incentives of firms to invest in developing new technology. We use a game theoretic model to study this and characterize the effect of contracts on economic welfare. The role of subsidies or taxes by a social planner is also considered.