(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice.
(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice.
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DOI：
10.1037/0022-3514.93.6.957
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发表时间：
2007-12
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Janetta Lun;S. Sinclair;Erin R Whitchurch;Catherine Glenn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Janetta Lun;S. Sinclair;Erin R Whitchurch;Catherine Glenn
本研究考察了经历认知动机（即获取知识的欲望）的人是否会有与另一个人的显性信念一致的内隐态度。当人们经历认知动机并与表面上持有平等主义信仰的人互动时，他们的内隐偏见会降低（实验1和2）。当人们不经历认知动机时，内隐偏见不受影响。进一步的证据表明，当信念得到另一个人的认可时，这种内隐态度的调整就会发生，而当这些信念通过不暗示这个人的认可的方式被带入脑海时，这种调整就不会发生（实验3）。结果表明，认识论激励的人的内隐态度与他人的明显信念相一致，以实现共同的现实。
This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.