Gerrymandering and Compactness: Implementation Flexibility and Abuse
Gerrymandering and Compactness: Implementation Flexibility and Abuse
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不公正划分选区和紧凑性：实施灵活性和滥用
DOI：
10.1017/pan.2020.36
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
J. Solomon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Richard Barnes;J. Solomon
可以吸引抽象的政治区，以偏爱一个团体或政党，而不是另一个团体或聚集。已经提出了许多测量值作为检测和防止这种行为的方法。这些措施及其及其区域和地区计划的混凝土轴。但是，测量值受噪声和看似无害的实施决策的复合效应的影响。任何措施都会出现此类问题。作为一项案例研究证明了这种效果，我们表明，地区边界的几何紧凑性的常用度量受到与公平或遵守民权法无关的几个因素的影响。我们进一步表明，对手可以操纵测量值以影响给定计划的评估。这种不稳定性将这些衡量标准作为立法或司法标准而复杂化，以抵消不公平的重新划分实践。本文伴随在C ++，Python和R中释放包装，这些包装正确，有效且可重复地计算出多种紧凑型评分。
Abstract Political districts may be drawn to favor one group or political party over another, or gerrymandered. A number of measurements have been suggested as ways to detect and prevent such behavior. These measures give concrete axes along which districts and districting plans can be compared. However, measurement values are affected by both noise and the compounding effects of seemingly innocuous implementation decisions. Such issues will arise for any measure. As a case study demonstrating the effect, we show that commonly used measures of geometric compactness for district boundaries are affected by several factors irrelevant to fairness or compliance with civil rights law. We further show that an adversary could manipulate measurements to affect the assessment of a given plan. This instability complicates using these measurements as legislative or judicial standards to counteract unfair redistricting practices. This paper accompanies the release of packages in C++, Python, and R that correctly, efficiently, and reproducibly calculate a variety of compactness scores.
影响因子：
1.2
作者：
DeFord, Daryl;Lavenant, Hugo;Schutzman, Zachary;Solomon, Justin
通讯作者：
Solomon, Justin