Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the "Russian world(s)'
Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the "Russian world(s)'
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DOI：
10.1177/1354066115601200
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发表时间：
2016-12-01
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Feklyunina, Valentina
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Feklyunina, Valentina
什么是软实力？我们如何对其进行实证分析？本文提出了一种社会建构主义对软实力的看法，将其与集体认同的概念联系起来，并提出了一套可用于评估两个或多个国家之间的关系中是否存在软实力的标准。它认为，软实力是通过对集体认同的不断重新谈判产生的。我们可以通过调查由第一个国家投射的话语建构的集体认同在多大程度上被第二个国家的不同受众接受或拒绝，以及通过检查这些受众影响外交政策决策过程的能力，来评估一个国家相对于另一个国家的软实力的权重。为了说明这一方法，本文将其应用于分析2014年危机前俄罗斯与乌克兰的关系。在2000年代末至2010年代初，俄罗斯的主导身份越来越多地与俄罗斯世界的概念联系在一起，这是一个基于俄语、俄罗斯文化和共同辉煌过去标志的想象共同体。尽管莫斯科在乌克兰的公共外交活动在那段时间大幅增加，但这些努力没有也无法从根本上改变莫斯科与基辅关系中的心理环境，因为所投射的身份与乌克兰的一种主要身份话语本质上是不相容的，而与另一种主要身份话语只是部分相容。
What is soft power, and how can we analyse it empirically? The article proposes a social constructivist take on soft power by anchoring it to the concept of collective identity, and by suggesting a set of criteria that can be used to assess whether soft power is present in a relationship between two or more states. It argues that soft power is generated through continuous renegotiation of collective identity. We can assess the weight of a state's soft power vis-a-vis another state by investigating the extent to which the discursively constructed collective identity projected by the first state is accepted or rejected by different audiences in the second state, and by examining the ability of these audiences to affect the process of foreign policy decision-making. To illustrate this approach, the article applies it to an analysis of Russia's relationship with Ukraine prior to the 2014 crisis. In the late 2000s-early 2010s, Russia's dominant identity was increasingly associated with the idea of a Russian world' an imagined community based on the markers of the Russian language, the Russian culture and the common glorious past. Despite a significant increase in Moscow's public diplomacy activities in Ukraine around that time, those efforts did not and could not fundamentally transform the psychological milieu in Moscow's relationship with Kyiv because the projected identity was inherently incompatible with one of the main identity discourses in Ukraine and was only partially compatible with another.