Do controlling shareholders expropriate employees? Evidence from workplace fatalities in China
Do controlling shareholders expropriate employees? Evidence from workplace fatalities in China
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DOI：
10.1016/j.pacfin.2021.101654
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发表时间：
2021-10
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Hang Liu;Jin‐hui Luo;Xin Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hang Liu;Jin‐hui Luo;Xin Wang
我们研究了在发生工伤事故的情况下，控股股东是否可以为了员工的私人利益而征用员工。本文以2008-2016年中国非国有上市公司为研究样本，以安全生产风险高的行业为研究对象，研究发现，以控制权和现金流权分离为衡量指标的控股股东侵占动机与事故死亡人数正相关。我们检查的鲁棒性，这一发现对endofrontation问题，采用第一差分估计模型，外源性冲击，和倾向得分匹配（PSM）的方法。此外，我们发现，征用激励和工作场所的死亡之间的正相关关系是更明显的公司治理较弱的公司，公司面临更严重的财务约束，公司遭受更强的征用问题，公司与较低的感知成本。最后，公司表现出较强的控股股东的征用动机表现较差的工作场所安全事故后，员工死亡。总体而言，我们认为，控股股东剥夺了员工的利益，这对员工和公司都有相当不利的影响。
We investigate whether controlling shareholders may expropriate employees for their private benefits in the case of workplace accidents. Using a sample of China's non-state-owned listed firms in industries with high workplace safety hazards during 2008–2016, we find that the expropriation incentives of controlling shareholders, as measured by the separation of control and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders, are positively related to workplace fatalities due to accidents. We check the robustness of this finding against the endogeneity problem by employing the first-difference estimator model, an exogenous shock, and the propensity score matching (PSM) approach. Furthermore, we show that the positive relation between expropriation incentives and workplace fatalities is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance, firms facing more severe financial constraints, firms suffering from stronger expropriation problems, and firms with lower perceived costs. Finally, firms exhibiting stronger expropriation motivations from controlling shareholders perform worse after workplace safety accidents with employee deaths. Overall, we suggest that controlling shareholders expropriate the interests of employees, which has considerably adverse impacts on employees and firms.