Plantinga and the contingently possible
Plantinga and the contingently possible
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普兰丁加和偶然的可能性
DOI：
10.1093/analys/36.2.106
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发表时间：
1976
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Hugh S. Chandler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hugh S. Chandler
在阿尔文·普兰丁格的最新著作《必然性的本质》（牛津，克拉伦登出版社，1974年）中，有一件有趣的事情，那就是他认为，不存在仅仅偶然可能的事态，即在某些可能的世界中可能，而在另一些世界中不可能。这一论点对普兰丁格很重要。如果争论是错误的，他的本体论论证的新版本是不合理的。然而，我想指出的是，可能性因世界而异。首先应该注意到，用普兰丁格的话来说，所讨论的可能性是“在广义逻辑意义上”的可能性，而不是例如物理可能性。
O NE of the interesting things in Alvin Plantinga's latest book, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974), is his contention that there are no states of affairs which are only contingently possible, ie possible in some possible worlds and not possible in others. This contention is important to Plantinga. His new version of the ontological argument is unsound if the contention is false. Nevertheless I want to suggest that what is possible varies from world to world. It should be noticed at the outset that the possibility in question is possibi-lity'in a broadly logical sense', to use Plantinga's words; not, for example, physical possibility.