Nuclear non-proliferation.
Nuclear non-proliferation.
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核不扩散。
DOI：
10.1126/science.215.4529.114
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发表时间：
1982
期刊：
影响因子：
56.9
通讯作者：
Edward J. Markey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Edward J. Markey
阻止核武器扩散到其他国家是国会高度关注的问题。尽管显然缺乏公众的兴趣，但不扩散是许多国会议员的优先问题(1)。因此，在考虑行政当局关于在激光同位素分离的帮助下使用商业乏燃料作为武器级钚来源的试验气球时，我认为Gerard C.Smith(2)在我的小组委员会1981年10月1日的听证会上的证词非常令人信服(《新闻与评论》，10月16日，第307页)。在1967年关于《不扩散条约》(不扩散条约)及其国际原子能机构(原子能机构)保障监督条款的谈判期间，美国提出将我们的和平核设施置于同样的保障监督之下，但保留以我们认为合适的任何方式使用特殊核材料的合法权利。1980年，参议院批准了美国和国际原子能机构之间的协议。因此，我们帮助建立了国际原子能机构和《不扩散核武器条约》下的国际保障计划，以确保商业核材料不被转用于武器用途，并同意以同样的方式保护我们的商业核设施，作为一个很好的例子，现在我们提议公开将我们的商业材料转移到武器渠道。用史密斯大使的话说：“如果国际原子能机构的核查人员定期报告出于军事目的转移我们的核电站，那将是一个可怕的例子，而在世界其他地方，他们的职责是试图发现这种转移，而根据条约的条款，这是非法的。”
Retardation of the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations is a matter of intense concern to Congress. Despite an apparent lack of public interest, non-proliferation is the priority issue for many congressmen (1). Thus, in considering the Administration's trial balloon on the use of commercial spent fuel as a source of weapons-grade plutonium with the aid of laser isotope separation, I find the testimony of Gerard C. Smith (2) at the hearing of my subcommittee on 1 October 1981 (News and Comment, 16 Oct., p. 307) most compelling. During the 1967 negotiations for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its provisions for safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States offered to place our peaceful nuclear facilities un-der the same safeguards, albeit reserving the legal right to use the special nuclear materials any way we see fit. An agree-ment to this effect between the United States and the IAEA was ratified by the Senate in 1980.Thus, we helped to set up the international safeguard program under the IAEA and the NPT to keep account of commercial nuclear materials to ensure that they are not diverted to weapons use, agreed to have our commercial nu-clear plants safeguarded in the same way, as a good example, and now we propose to divert openly our commercial materials into weapons channels. In Ambassador Smith's words:" it would be a horrible example if the inspectors from the IAEA were periodically reporting diversions from our nuclear power plants for military purposes, when all over the rest of the world their function would be to try to discover such diversions which would be illegal under the terms of the treaty."