Legislative Constraints on Executive Unilateralism in Separation of Powers Systems
Legislative Constraints on Executive Unilateralism in Separation of Powers Systems
复制标题
三权分立制度下行政单边主义的立法约束
DOI：
10.1111/lsq.12232
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Sharece Thrower
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Michael J. Barber;Alexander Bolton;Sharece Thrower
立法机关能否有效制约单边行政权力？之前的研究中一个突出且违反直觉的发现是，在分裂的政府下，高管们较少追求单边主义。尽管高管们认为在分裂政府期间通过单边行动可以获得更大的潜在政策收益，但我们认为，他们采取单边行动的可能性取决于反对方立法机构的报复能力。当两极分化严重且大多数人处于边缘状态时，鉴于立法机构在法定回应方面存在困难，高管们更容易采取单方面行动。如果立法机关缺乏监管审查等非法定惩罚手段，那么在面临反对时，单边主义也更有可能发生。在迄今为止最大规模的州长行政单边主义分析中，我们使用了 1993 年至 2013 年间美国 50 个州的 24,232 条行政命令的新数据集来评估这一论点，并为其预测找到强有力的支持。这些结果为了解立法决策能力如何影响分权制度的运作提供了见解。
Can legislatures effectively check unilateral executive power? One prominent and counterintuitive finding in previous work is that executives pursue unilateralism less often under divided government. While executives see greater potential policy gains through unilateral action during divided government, we argue that their likelihood of acting unilaterally depends on an opposed legislature’s ability to retaliate. When polarization is high and majorities are marginal, executives are freer to act unilaterally given the difficulties legislatures have in statutorily responding. unilateralism is also more likely when facing opposition if legislatures lack nonstatutory means of punishment, such as regulatory review. in the largest analysis of gubernatorial executive unilateralism to date, we use a new data set of 24,232 executive orders in the 50 american states between 1993 and 2013 to evaluate this argument and find strong support for its predictions. these results provide insights into how legislative policymaking capacity can influence the functioning of separation of powers systems.