Equilibrium Analysis of the Observable Queue with Balking and Delayed Repairs
Equilibrium Analysis of the Observable Queue with Balking and Delayed Repairs
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DOI：
10.1016/j.amc.2011.08.012
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发表时间：
2010-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jinting Wang;Feng Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jinting Wang;Feng Zhang
研究了具有服务故障和延迟维修的完全可观测和部分可观测的单服务台排队的平衡门限停顿策略。到达后，顾客根据对服务的排队长度和状态的观察，以及对等待成本和服务结束后的回报的考虑，决定是否加入或停止排队。利用马尔可夫链方法和系统成本分析，得到了排队系统队长的平稳分布，并给出了确定完全和部分可观测模型的均衡策略的算法。最后，分别给出了完全可观测系统和部分可观测系统在服务器故障和维修延迟情况下的均衡门限止步策略和所有用户的均衡社会效益。
The equilibrium threshold balking strategies are investigated for the fully observable and partially observable single-server queues with server breakdowns and delayed repairs. Upon arriving, the customers decide whether to join or balk the queue based on observation of the queue length and status of the server, along with the consideration of waiting cost and the reward after finishing their service. By using Markov chain approach and system cost analysis, we obtain the stationary distribution of queue size of the queueing systems and provide algorithms in order to identify the equilibrium strategies for the fully and partially observable models. Finally, the equilibrium threshold balking strategies and the equilibrium social benefit for all customers are derived for the fully and partially observable system respectively, both with server breakdowns and delayed repairs.