Auction reforms for effective official development assistance
Auction reforms for effective official development assistance
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DOI：
10.1007/s11151-006-0012-x
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发表时间：
2006-03-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Iimi, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Iimi, A
拍卖适用于与援助有关的采购制度，最近已被确认为提高经济效率的一个重要工具。利用日本官方发展援助项目的采购拍卖数据，估计均衡投标函数。数据显示，投标人数量每增加1%，均衡投标就会减少约0.2%。这意味着加强采购拍卖的竞争会降低合同价格，减轻发展中国家的沉重债务。拍卖也有助于促进当地的商业环境和治理。为了加强投标竞争，应采用电子投标系统，鼓励当地公司联合投标，并放宽过多的资格要求。
Auctions, which are applicable to aid-related procurement systems, have been recently recognized as an important tool for improving economic efficiency. Using data on procurement auctions for Japanese official development assistance projects, the equilibrium bid function is estimated. The data reveals that a 1% increase in the number of bidders decreases the equilibrium bid by about 0.2%. This implies that strengthening competition at procurement auctions lowers contract prices and mitigates the heavy indebtedness of developing countries. Auctions are also instrumental in fostering local business environment and governance. For intensifying bidding competition, it is useful to introduce an electronic bidding system, encourage local firms to jointly bid, and relax excessive qualification requirements.