Tax Incidence Under Oligopoly: A Comparison of Policy Approaches
Tax Incidence Under Oligopoly: A Comparison of Policy Approaches
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寡头垄断下的税收发生率：政策方法的比较
DOI：
10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00066-8
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
S. Hamilton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Hamilton
本文提出了一种分析税收发生率的方法方法，该方法在一般和分析方便的模型中包含了熟悉的税收形式。在寡头垄断产业中，税收的实施取决于单位税率对产业产出变化的敏感性。产出弹性税收表不太可能过度转移，并且相对于对均衡市场数量反应较差的监管工具具有更好的福利属性。对于收入中性的税收改革，Delipalla和Keen（1992）关于从价税在寡头垄断下福利占主导地位的特定税的发现是这一一般结果的一个特例。
This paper presents a methodological approach for the analysis of tax incidence that encompasses familiar forms of taxation in a general and analytically convenient model. In oligopolistic industries, the performance of a tax depends on the sensitivity of the unit tax rate to changes in industry output. Output-elastic tax schedules are less likely to be over-shifted and have superior welfare properties relative to regulatory instruments that are less responsive to the equilibrium market quantity. For revenue neutral tax reforms, the finding of Delipalla and Keen (1992)that ad valorem taxes welfare-dominate specific taxes under oligopoly is derived as a special case of this general result.