Getting the story right: a Reductionist narrative account of personal identity
Getting the story right: a Reductionist narrative account of personal identity
复制标题
让故事正确：个人身份的还原论叙述
DOI：
10.1007/s11098-014-0278-z
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
R. Schroer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jeanine Weekes Schroer;R. Schroer
一种流行的“还原论者”对人格同一性的解释，凭借人格阶段彼此之间的心理连续性，将人格阶段统一为人格。对心理连续性解释的一个反对意见是，我们的个人同一性不仅仅是心理连续性：还有一个自我解释和自我创造的积极过程。这种批评可以被用来激发一种对个人同一性的竞争性解释，这种解释诉诸于叙事的概念。就他们对这个问题的评论而言，叙事叙述的支持者通常拒绝还原论者的形而上学，这种形而上学（在本体论上）将人还原为人的阶段的集合。与这一趋势相反，我们试图从还原主义形而上学内部发展一种关于个人同一性的叙述性叙述：我们认为，个人的各个阶段由于它们的叙述性连续性而统一成个人。我们认为，这种还原论者版本的叙述性解释避免了非还原论者版本的叙述性解释所面临的一些严重问题。
A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment upon the issue, proponents of narrative accounts typically reject Reductionist metaphysics that (ontologically) reduce persons to aggregates of person stages. In contrast to this trend, we seek to develop a narrative account of personal identity from within Reductionist metaphysics: we think person stages are unified into persons in virtue of their narrativecontinuity with one another. We argue that this Reductionist version of the narrative account avoids some serious problems facing non-Reductionist versions of the narrative account.