Advancing Emotion Regulation Perspectives on Psychopathology: The Challenge of Distress Disorders.
Advancing Emotion Regulation Perspectives on Psychopathology: The Challenge of Distress Disorders.
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DOI:
10.1080/1047840x.2015.969624
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发表时间:
2015
影响因子:
9.3
通讯作者:
Fresco DM
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Mennin DS;Fresco DM
The study of emotion regulation has impacted numerous subfields of psychology including developmental, organizational, social, cognitive, neurobiological, and health investigations (see Gross, 2014). The subfield of clinical psychology was initially slower to utilize an emotion regulation perspective (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2002) but has now substantially incorporated this perspective into theoretical, experimental, assessment, and intervention contexts (see Gross, 2014; Kring & Sloan, 2009). One clear benefit has been a greater integration of clinical psychology with the other subfields of psychology. Ten years ago, cognitive and biological models of psychopathological conditions appeared quite divergent. Today, for instance, it is quite common to see the neural functioning of disorders examined in relation to specific cognitive processes and corresponding tasks (eg, Etkin, Prater, Hoeft, Menon, & Schatzberg, 2010). Further, in no small part due to the study of emotion regulation, the overall field of psychology is more integrated with clinical psychology contributing prominently to this fieldwide integration. Gross (this issue) provides a compelling extension to his process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), addressing findings in the extant empirical literature that both support and challenge prior emotion regulation perspectives (Webb, Miles, & Shereen, 2012). Particularly relevant to psychopathology, Gross stresses three considerations for understanding the process and implementation of emotion regulation. First, he emphasizes function, highlighting the importance of temporally related functional relationships within and between “valuation systems” that are enacted to discriminate whether something is “good for me” versus “bad for me.” Gross explains that emotion generation and regulation can be seen as operating as different valuation systems, where the former is enacted to mobilize us toward or away from beneficial or harmful external stimuli in the world or internal representations of stimuli in the world (ie,“first-level valuation” system) and the latter is enacted to influence or correct the first valuation system at different points along the emotion generation trajectory, in order to be responsive to changing internal goals and external circumstances (ie,“secondlevel valuation” system). Second, he emphasizes structure (also discussed in greater detail in Ochsner & Gross, 2014), demonstrating that valuations at each level can be enacted with less elaborative to more elaborative representational complexity involving relatively less depleting perceptual processes that direct attention and more depleting verbally mediated cognitive processes that invoke appraisals (Badre & D’Esposito, 2007). At the neural level, increasing cognitive elaboration appears to be associated with medial prefrontal (PFC) recruitment that moves from ventral to dorsal regions with increasing representational complexity (Ochsner & Gross, 2014). Activation of representationally elaborative processes involves increased mental effort and, thus, can result in greater resource depletion given competition for these resources (Joormann, Nee, Berman, Jonides, & Gotlib, 2010; MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Third, along with others (eg, Aldao, 2013; Bonanno & Burton, 2013), Gross stresses the importance of context and corresponding emotion regulation flexibility such that the utility of an emotion regulation strategy may covary with the circumstances it is enacted within. For instance, given highly emotionally evocative contexts, optimal emotion regulation may most effectively involve engaging less elaborative capacities (eg, attentional distraction …