Advancing Emotion Regulation Perspectives on Psychopathology: The Challenge of Distress Disorders.

Advancing Emotion Regulation Perspectives on Psychopathology: The Challenge of Distress Disorders.
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DOI:
10.1080/1047840x.2015.969624
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发表时间:
2015
影响因子:
9.3
通讯作者:
Fresco DM
Fresco DM
中科院分区:
心理学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Mennin DS;Fresco DM

文献摘要

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情绪调节的研究影响了心理学的许多子领域,包括发展,组织,社会,认知,神经生物学和健康调查(见格罗斯,2014)。临床心理学的子领域最初利用情绪调节视角的速度较慢(Mennin,Heimberg,Turk,& Fresco,2002),但现在已经基本上将这种视角纳入理论,实验,评估和干预环境(见Gross,2014; Kring & Sloan,2009)。一个明显的好处是临床心理学与心理学的其他子领域的更大整合。十年前,心理病理学状况的认知模型和生物模型出现了很大的分歧。例如,如今,人们经常看到疾病的神经功能与特定的认知过程和相应的任务相关(例如,Etkin、Prater、Hoeft、Menon和Schatzberg,2010年)。此外,在不小的部分,由于情绪调节的研究,心理学的整体领域更与临床心理学相结合,突出地促进了这一领域的整合。Gross(本期)对他的情绪调节过程模型(Gross,1998)进行了令人信服的扩展,解决了现存实证文献中的发现,这些发现既支持又挑战了先前的情绪调节观点(Webb,Miles,& Shereen,2012)。特别是与精神病理学相关的,格罗斯强调了理解情绪调节过程和实施的三个考虑因素。首先,他强调了功能,强调了“评价系统”内部和之间的时间相关功能关系的重要性,这些系统旨在区分某件事是“对我好”还是“对我坏”。格罗斯解释说,情绪的产生和调节可以被看作是不同的评价系统,前者是为了动员我们走向或远离世界上有益或有害的外部刺激或世界上刺激的内部表征(即,“第一级评价”系统),并且后者被制定为在沿着情绪生成轨迹的不同点处影响或校正第一评价系统,以应对不断变化的内部目标和外部环境(即“二级估值”系统)。第二,他强调结构(Ochsner & Gross,2014中也有更详细的讨论),表明每个层次的评价都可以通过较少的精细到更多的精细表征复杂性来制定,涉及相对较少的消耗知觉过程,直接注意力和更多的消耗口头介导的认知过程,引发评价(Badre & D 'Esposito,2007)。在神经水平上,认知加工的增加似乎与内侧前额叶(PFC)的募集有关,该募集从腹侧区域移动到背侧区域,并增加了表征的复杂性(Ochsner & Gross,2014)。表征性精细加工的激活涉及增加的脑力劳动,因此,考虑到对这些资源的竞争,可能导致更大的资源消耗(Joormann,Nee,Berman,Jonides,& Gotlib,2010; MacNamara & Hajcak,2010; Muraven & Baumeister,2000)。第三,沿着其他人(例如,Aldao,2013; Bonanno & Burton,2013),Gross强调了情境和相应的情绪调节灵活性的重要性,这样情绪调节策略的效用可能会随着它所处的环境而变化。例如,在高度情绪化的情境中,最佳情绪调节可能最有效地涉及参与较少的精细能力(例如,注意力分散)。
The study of emotion regulation has impacted numerous subfields of psychology including developmental, organizational, social, cognitive, neurobiological, and health investigations (see Gross, 2014). The subfield of clinical psychology was initially slower to utilize an emotion regulation perspective (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2002) but has now substantially incorporated this perspective into theoretical, experimental, assessment, and intervention contexts (see Gross, 2014; Kring & Sloan, 2009). One clear benefit has been a greater integration of clinical psychology with the other subfields of psychology. Ten years ago, cognitive and biological models of psychopathological conditions appeared quite divergent. Today, for instance, it is quite common to see the neural functioning of disorders examined in relation to specific cognitive processes and corresponding tasks (eg, Etkin, Prater, Hoeft, Menon, & Schatzberg, 2010). Further, in no small part due to the study of emotion regulation, the overall field of psychology is more integrated with clinical psychology contributing prominently to this fieldwide integration. Gross (this issue) provides a compelling extension to his process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), addressing findings in the extant empirical literature that both support and challenge prior emotion regulation perspectives (Webb, Miles, & Shereen, 2012). Particularly relevant to psychopathology, Gross stresses three considerations for understanding the process and implementation of emotion regulation. First, he emphasizes function, highlighting the importance of temporally related functional relationships within and between “valuation systems” that are enacted to discriminate whether something is “good for me” versus “bad for me.” Gross explains that emotion generation and regulation can be seen as operating as different valuation systems, where the former is enacted to mobilize us toward or away from beneficial or harmful external stimuli in the world or internal representations of stimuli in the world (ie,“first-level valuation” system) and the latter is enacted to influence or correct the first valuation system at different points along the emotion generation trajectory, in order to be responsive to changing internal goals and external circumstances (ie,“secondlevel valuation” system). Second, he emphasizes structure (also discussed in greater detail in Ochsner & Gross, 2014), demonstrating that valuations at each level can be enacted with less elaborative to more elaborative representational complexity involving relatively less depleting perceptual processes that direct attention and more depleting verbally mediated cognitive processes that invoke appraisals (Badre & D’Esposito, 2007). At the neural level, increasing cognitive elaboration appears to be associated with medial prefrontal (PFC) recruitment that moves from ventral to dorsal regions with increasing representational complexity (Ochsner & Gross, 2014). Activation of representationally elaborative processes involves increased mental effort and, thus, can result in greater resource depletion given competition for these resources (Joormann, Nee, Berman, Jonides, & Gotlib, 2010; MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Third, along with others (eg, Aldao, 2013; Bonanno & Burton, 2013), Gross stresses the importance of context and corresponding emotion regulation flexibility such that the utility of an emotion regulation strategy may covary with the circumstances it is enacted within. For instance, given highly emotionally evocative contexts, optimal emotion regulation may most effectively involve engaging less elaborative capacities (eg, attentional distraction …