Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model
Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model
复制标题
连续时间代理模型中的管理激励和顾问的角色
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/hht027
复制
发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Keiichi Hori and Hiroshi Osano
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Keiichi Hori and Hiroshi Osano
我们研究了一个具有双重道德风险的连续时间代理模型。利用风险投资家和企业家之间的关系，我们发现在双重道德风险下的最优IPO时机早于单一道德风险下的最优IPO时机。我们的结果还表明，在双重道德风险的情况下，经理的薪酬往往会提前支付。我们得出了几个比较静态的结果，值得注意的是，当风投需要监控的时候，当现金流的波动性较大时，IPO时机就会更早。
We explore a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a venture capitalist (VC)–entrepreneur relationship where the VC both supplies costly effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering (IPO), we show that optimal IPO timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard. Our results also indicate that the manager's compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard. We derive several comparative static results, notably that IPO timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the VC is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger.