Hume, Passion, and Action
Hume, Passion, and Action
复制标题
休谟、激情和行动
DOI：
10.1093/oso/9780199573295.001.0001
复制
发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe
大卫·休谟的行动理论因几个具有挑衅性的论点而广为人知，其中包括激情和理性不能在行动的方向上对立。在《休谟、激情和行动》一书中，作者为休谟关于激情、理性和动机的原创性解释进行了辩护，这种解释与休谟哲学中的其他论点一致，忠于他的文本，并处于历史地位。这本书挑战了目前对休谟关于动机的正统解释，提出了另一种选择，使休谟比许多最近的解释者更接近休谟。这一策略的一部分是考察休谟回应的早期现代知识分子的思想。这些思想家中的大多数人坚持认为，除非受到理性的约束，否则激情会导致我们追求有害的目标；大多数人认为激情是善和恶的代表，这可能是错误的。要理解休谟对这些主张的反应，就需要理解他对理性和激情的各自描述。作者认为，休谟关于理性在激情之外实际上是无能为力的论点是关于理性产生的信念，而不是关于理性的能力。此外，这一论点也解释了休谟有时被嘲讽地将激情描述为与客体无关的“原始存在”。作者还展示了休谟如何将道德理解为内在的动机，同时认为道德信仰本身并不是动机，以及为什么他认为激情是自我调节的，这与理性主义者的告诫相反。
David Hume’s theory of action is well known for several provocative theses, including that passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. In Hume, Passion, and Action, the author defends an original interpretation of Hume’s views on passion, reason, and motivation that is consistent with other theses in Hume’s philosophy, loyal to his texts, and historically situated. This book challenges the now orthodox interpretation of Hume on motivation, presenting an alternative that situates Hume closer to “Humeans” than many recent interpreters have. Part of the strategy is to examine the thinking of the early modern intellectuals to whom Hume responds. Most of these thinkers insisted that passions lead us to pursue harmful objects unless regulated by reason; and most regarded passions as representations of good and evil, which can be false. Understanding Hume’s response to these claims requires appreciating his respective characterizations of reason and passion. The author argues that Hume’s thesis that reason is practically impotent apart from passion is about beliefs generated by reason, rather than about the capacity of reason. Furthermore, the argument makes sense of Hume’s sometimes-ridiculed description of passions as “original existences” having no reference to objects. The author also shows how Hume understood morality as intrinsically motivating, while holding that moral beliefs are not themselves motives, and why he thought of passions as self-regulating, contrary to the admonitions of the rationalists.