Common-Knowledge and Cooperation Management II S4n-Knowledge Model Case
Common-Knowledge and Cooperation Management II S4n-Knowledge Model Case
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公共知识与合作管理II S4n-知识模型案例
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-11289-3_54
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Takashi Matsuhisa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Masato Kimura;Takeshi Takaishi;Takashi Ohe and Kohzaburo Ohnaka;Takashi Matsuhisa
道德风险和逆向选择的问题在每一个合同中都比比皆是，其中一方有自己的利益和另一方不拥有的信息，并且仍然需要更多的信息来了解你如何处理比你信息更多的合同一方。本文在一个不确定性条件下的委托代理模型框架下重新审视了这一问题。我们强调认识条件的可能决议之间的主要和代理人与S4 n-知识的道德风险，我们表明，如果principalr和代理人共同知道每个代理人的信念，对其他人的努力，那么所有的努力水平，使预期的边际成本实际上符合他们可以被描述为退还比例率函数的临界点。这意味着我们的建议，为了消除这种道德风险的委托代理合作，委托人和代理人应该共同知道他们的信念对他人的努力水平。
Issues of moral hazard and adverse selection abound in each and every contract where one has a self interest and information that the other party does not possess, and there is still need for more information on how you handle a party to a contract with more information than you. This paper re-examines the issue in the framework of a principal-agent model under uncertainty. We highlight epistemic conditions for a possible resolution of the moral hazard between the principal and the agents withS4n-knowledge, and we show that if the principalr and agents commonly know each agent’s belief on the others’ efforts, then all effort levels such that the expected marginal costs actually coincide for them can be characterised as the critical points of the refunded proportional rate function. This implies our recommendation that, for removing out such moral hazard in the principal-agents cooperation, the principal and agents should commonly know their beliefs on the others’ effort levels.