Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid
Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid
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DOI：
10.1016/0014-2921(95)00127-1
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发表时间：
1996-02-01
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
Boone, P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Boone, P
对外援助计划的批评者长期以来一直认为贫困反映了政府的失败。在本文中，我基于将援助有效性与政治制度联系起来的分析框架来测试对援助有效性的预测。我发现援助并没有显着增加投资，也没有使穷人受益（以人类发展指标的改善来衡量），但它确实增加了政府规模。援助的影响并不因受援国政府是自由民主政府还是高度压制政府而异。但在其他条件不变的情况下，自由政体和民主政体的婴儿死亡率比最不自由政体的婴儿死亡率平均低 30%。这可能是由于自由主义政权下穷人获得了更大的权力，尽管政治精英继续获得援助计划的好处。这意味着，旨在支持新自由主义政权的短期援助可能是比现有计划更成功的减贫手段。
Critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure. In this paper I test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes. I find that aid does not significantly increase investment, nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators, but it does increase the size of government. The impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive. But liberal political regimes and democracies, ceteris paribus, have on average 30% lower infant mortality than the least free regimes. This may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs. An implication is that short-term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs.