Detection and Mitigation of Data Manipulation Attacks in AC Microgrids
Detection and Mitigation of Data Manipulation Attacks in AC Microgrids
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DOI：
10.1109/tsg.2019.2958014
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发表时间：
2020-05-01
影响因子：
9.6
通讯作者：
Modares, Hamidreza
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mustafa, Aquib;Poudel, Binod;Modares, Hamidreza
提出了一种针对数据操纵攻击下交流微电网分布式频率和电压控制的弹性控制框架。为了使每个分布式能源（DER）能够检测到相邻DER上的任何不当行为，首先提出了一种基于Kullback-Liebler （KL）散度准则的攻击检测机制。然后提出了一种攻击缓解技术，利用计算的KL散度因子来确定表明接收信息可信度的信任值。此外，der不断地产生一个自我信念因素，并与邻居进行沟通，告知他们自己发出的信息的有效程度。der将其邻居的自信和自己的信任值纳入其控制协议，以减缓和减轻攻击。结果表明，所提出的网络安全控制能够有效地将数据操纵攻击与合法事件区分开来。通过在IEEE 34总线测试馈线上采用6个der实现的微电网测试系统仿真，验证了所提出的安全频率和电压控制技术的性能。
This paper presents a resilient control framework for distributed frequency and voltage control of AC microgrids under data manipulation attacks. In order for each distributed energy resource (DER) to detect any misbehavior on its neighboring DERs, an attack detection mechanism is first presented using a Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence-based criterion. An attack mitigation technique is then proposed that utilizes the calculated KL divergence factors to determine trust values indicating the trustworthiness of the received information. Moreover, DERs continuously generate a self-belief factor and communicate it with their neighbors to inform them of the validity level of their own outgoing information. DERs incorporate their neighbors' self-belief and their own trust values in their control protocols to slow down and mitigate attacks. It is shown that the proposed cyber-secure control effectively distinguishes data manipulation attacks from legitimate events. The performance of proposed secure frequency and voltage control techniques is verified through the simulation of microgrid tests system implemented on IEEE 34-bus test feeder with six DERs.