Response time in economic games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals
Response time in economic games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1608877114
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发表时间：
2017-05
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Yamagishi;Yoshie Matsumoto;T. Kiyonari;Haruto Takagishi;Yang Li;R. Kanai;M. Sakagami
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Yamagishi;Yoshie Matsumoto;T. Kiyonari;Haruto Takagishi;Yang Li;R. Kanai;M. Sakagami
亲社会倾向和亲我倾向决定了经济博弈参与者的快速决策，但当博弈参与者需要较长的决策时间时，亲社会倾向和亲我倾向的影响有限。亲社会倾向的人利用延长的时间来考虑被剥削的风险。当自私倾向的个体迅速做出决定时，他们会根据游戏的即时激励来行事，并且当他们花更多的时间评估总是根据即时激励行事的长期战略影响时，他们的行为变得不那么自私。需要采取不同的战略来促进亲社会行为，并根据人口的构成来设计机构。行为和神经科学研究探索了内化的社会规范促进亲社会行为的两种途径。一个途径涉及冲动自私的内部控制，另一个途径涉及基于情感的亲社会偏好，当他们逃避认知控制以追求自身利益时，这些偏好会转化为行为。我们测量了443名参与者在四个经济游戏中的整体亲社会行为。参与者的倾向[社会价值取向（SVO）]更强烈地反映在他们的整体游戏行为时，他们作出决定快，而不是当他们花了更长的时间。亲社会（或自私）倾向的参与者在决策中花费更多时间时表现出较少的亲社会（或较少自私），因此他们的SVO亲社会性在他们缓慢决策的实际行为中产生有限的影响。缓慢的决策者的增加（或减少）是突出的一致亲社会（或proselfs）的强烈偏好亲社会（或亲自我）的目标将使其不太可能经历亲社会和亲自我的目标之间的冲突。RT对一致的亲社会者（或改宗者）行为的强烈影响表明，亲社会目标和自私目标之间的冲突本身并不是缓慢决策的原因。具体来说，我们发现，沉思被他人利用的风险（社会风险厌恶）是部分负责一致的亲社会（但不是一致的proselfs）花更长的时间在决策和行为不亲社会。手段之间的冲突，而不是目标之间的冲突（直接与战略追求自我利益）被认为是负责与时间相关的增加一致的改宗者的亲社会行为。本研究的结果总体上支持亲社会行为的直觉合作模式。
Significance Prosocial and proself predispositions dictate economic game players’ fast decisions but exert limited influence when game players take a longer time in making decisions. Prosocially predisposed individuals use the extended time to contemplate the risk of being exploited. Selfishly predisposed individuals are suggested to behave according to the immediate incentives of the games when they make decisions quickly and become behaviorally less selfish as they spend more time assessing the long-term strategic implications of always behaving according to immediate incentives. Different strategies are needed to promote prosocial behavior and to design institutions depending on the constitution of the population. Behavioral and neuroscientific studies explore two pathways through which internalized social norms promote prosocial behavior. One pathway involves internal control of impulsive selfishness, and the other involves emotion-based prosocial preferences that are translated into behavior when they evade cognitive control for pursuing self-interest. We measured 443 participants’ overall prosocial behavior in four economic games. Participants’ predispositions [social value orientation (SVO)] were more strongly reflected in their overall game behavior when they made decisions quickly than when they spent a longer time. Prosocially (or selfishly) predisposed participants behaved less prosocially (or less selfishly) when they spent more time in decision making, such that their SVO prosociality yielded limited effects in actual behavior in their slow decisions. The increase (or decrease) in slower decision makers was prominent among consistent prosocials (or proselfs) whose strong preference for prosocial (or proself) goals would make it less likely to experience conflict between prosocial and proself goals. The strong effect of RT on behavior in consistent prosocials (or proselfs) suggests that conflict between prosocial and selfish goals alone is not responsible for slow decisions. Specifically, we found that contemplation of the risk of being exploited by others (social risk aversion) was partly responsible for making consistent prosocials (but not consistent proselfs) spend longer time in decision making and behave less prosocially. Conflict between means rather than between goals (immediate versus strategic pursuit of self-interest) was suggested to be responsible for the time-related increase in consistent proselfs’ prosocial behavior. The findings of this study are generally in favor of the intuitive cooperation model of prosocial behavior.