Optimal Control of Selling Channels for an Online Retailer with Cost‐per‐Click Payments and Seasonal Products
Optimal Control of Selling Channels for an Online Retailer with Cost‐per‐Click Payments and Seasonal Products
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00260.x
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发表时间：
2007-05
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Frank Y. Chen;Jing Chen;Yongbo Xiao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Frank Y. Chen;Jing Chen;Yongbo Xiao
本文研究的问题是对在出版商或比较购物网站上做广告的在线零售商（电子零售商）所面临的决策的简化。电子零售商不仅可以通过其在线和实体店销售其产品，还可以通过一个或多个第三方的网站（例如 Yahoo.com）销售其产品。然而，电子零售商必须在基于操作的支付方案中向此类第三方支付一定金额，例如每次点击费用（CPC）方案。根据每次点击费用计划，付款仅基于点击次数，这意味着电子零售商仅在购物者点击其网站的产品页面时才付款。此类点击中只有一小部分会带来实际销售。与直接访问电子零售商在线商店的购物者相比，首次点击进入第三方网站的购物者需要支付额外费用，这使得他们作为客户的吸引力降低。此外，显着位置的每次点击费用通常是通过竞价确定的，因此会随着时间的推移而变化。因此，电子零售商需要动态决定是否在第三方网站上列出。讨论了最优政策的结构特性，并给出了数值例子来显示动态上市控制对收入的影响。
The problem studied in this paper is a predigestion of the decision faced by online retailers (etailers) that advertise on publisher or comparison‐shopping websites. An etailer may sell its product not only through its online and bricks‐and‐mortar stores, but also through the websites of one or more third parties (e.g., Yahoo.com). However, the etailer has to pay a certain amount to such third parties in an action‐based payment scheme, such as a cost‐per‐click (CPC) scheme. Under the CPC scheme, payment is based solely on click‐throughs, which means that the etailer pays only when a shopper clicks through to the product page of its website. Only a fraction of such clicks lead to actual sales. The extra cost that is associated with shoppers who first click through to the third‐party websites makes them less attractive as customers than those who directly visit the etailer's online store. Moreover, the CPC rate for a prominent placement is normally set by competitive bidding, and thus varies over time. Therefore, the etailer needs to decide dynamically whether or not to list on a third‐party website. The structural properties of the optimal policy are discussed, and numerical examples are given to show the revenue impact of dynamic listing control.