Delay-Conscious Defense Against Fingerprinting Attacks
Delay-Conscious Defense Against Fingerprinting Attacks
复制标题
针对指纹攻击的延迟意识防御
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kyoungwon Suh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jingyuan Liang;Chansu Yu;Kyoungwon Suh
——在过去的几年里，人们提出了许多针对网站指纹攻击的防御机制。众所周知，建立在 Tor 网络之上的对讲机 (WT) 是最有效的防御机制之一。然而，我们观察到，与其他方法相比，WT 显着增加了页面加载时间（时间开销），同时增加了很少的带宽开销。我们分析了页面加载时间增加的原因，并提出了一种称为尾部超时（TT）的防御方法，该方法通过引入超时机制来限制待处理请求可以阻止后续请求的最长时间，从而解决了该问题。我们的实验结果表明，所提出的 TT 防御可以显着减少页面加载时间，同时在 WT 实现的真阳性率和真阴性率方面保持相似的防御性能。
—In the past few years, many defense mechanisms have been proposed against website fingerprinting attacks. Walkie-Talkie (WT) built on top of Tor network is known to be one of the most effective and efficient defense mechanisms. However, we observed that WT significantly increases page loading times (time overhead) while adding little bandwidth overhead compared to other approaches. We analyze the cause of the increased page loading time and present a defending approach called Tail Timeout (TT), which addresses the problem, by introducing a timeout mechanism limiting the maximum time for which a pending request can block subsequent requests. Our experimental results indicate that the proposed TT defense can significantly reduce the page loading time while keeping similar defense performance in terms of true positive and true negative ratios achieved by WT.
p1-FP：利用深度学习提取、分类和预测网站指纹
影响因子：
--
作者：
Oh, Se Eun;Sunkam, Saikrishna;Hopper, Nicholas
通讯作者：
Hopper, Nicholas