On privacy preference in collusion-deterrence games for secure multi-party computation
On privacy preference in collusion-deterrence games for secure multi-party computation
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DOI：
10.1109/icassp.2016.7472036
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发表时间：
2016-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zhaohong Wang;S. Cheung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhaohong Wang;S. Cheung
安全多方计算(MPC)已经成为分布式计算中保护隐私的事实范例。信息论安全的MPC协议虽然比它们的计算安全协议更有效，但需要至少三个计算方，并且容易受到合谋攻击。之前的研究使用了机制设计来阻止串通。缺少的一个重要因素是考虑到不同的参与者如何重视隐私。在这篇文章中，我们提供了一个详细的分析，在不同的隐私偏好下可能的结果，基于相对代价的合谋攻击损失的隐私。我们明确计算了诚实是解决方案的条件。仿真结果进一步证明了机构设计的有效性。
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) has been established as the de facto paradigm for protecting privacy in distributed computation. Information-theoretic secure MPC protocols, though more efficient than their computationally secure counterparts, require at least three computational parties and are prone to collusion attacks. Previous work has used mechanism designs to deter collusion. An important element missing is the consideration of how different players value privacy. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of possible outcomes under different privacy preferences based on the relative cost of collusion attacks over loss of privacy. We explicitly calculate the conditions under which honesty is the solution. Simulation results provide further evidence to demonstrate the validity of our mechanism design.