Nash strategies for pursuit-evasion differential games involving limited observations
Nash strategies for pursuit-evasion differential games involving limited observations
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DOI：
10.1109/taes.2014.130569
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发表时间：
2015-06
影响因子：
4.4
通讯作者：
Wei Lin;Z. Qu;M. Simaan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Wei Lin;Z. Qu;M. Simaan
研究了一类线性二次N-追赶者单逃避者微分对策。逃避者可以观察到所有的追踪者，但追踪者对自己和逃避者的观察有限。逃避者实施传统的反馈纳什策略和追求者实施纳什策略的基础上，一个新的概念，最佳可实现的性能指标。这个问题在装备精良的无人驾驶车辆躲避几个装备薄弱的追击车辆的情况下具有潜在的应用。解决了一个说明性的例子，并提出了几种方案。
A linear-quadratic N-pursuer single-evader differential game is considered. The evader can observe all the pursuers but pursuers have limited observations of themselves and the evader. The evader implements the conventional feedback Nash strategy and the pursuers implement Nash strategies based on a novel concept of best achievable performance indices. This problem has potential applications in situations where a well-equipped unmanned vehicle is evading several weakly equipped pursuing vehicles. An illustrative example is solved, and several scenarios are presented.