An Unfair Option Game: The Effects of Asymmetric Government Subsidy to Innovators and Imitators
An Unfair Option Game: The Effects of Asymmetric Government Subsidy to Innovators and Imitators
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不公平的选择博弈：不对称政府补贴对创新者和模仿者的影响
DOI：
10.12973/ejmste/77909
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Rongda Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Congcong Wang;Yan Fang;Rongda Chen
本文建立了一个实物期权博弈模型来分析不对称政府补贴对在价格不确定的同一市场中相互竞争的私人投资者投资门槛的影响。推导了创新者和模仿者的最优投资门槛，并分析了通货膨胀率、利率、知识产权保护程度等关键变量对门槛的影响。借助我们的模型和污水处理行业的数值例子，我们证明了对创新者和模仿者的补贴都降低了最优投资门槛，而仅对创新者的补贴提高了投资门槛而不是降低了投资门槛。根据我们的研究结果，我们建议政府对创新者和模仿者一视同仁地给予补贴，提高知识产权保护的整体水平，降低私人投资者的财务成本，以激励他们投资PPP项目。
This article develops a model of real option game to analyze effect of asymmetric government subsidy on the investment thresholds of private investors who compete with each other in the same market with uncertain price. The optimal investment thresholds of innovator and imitator are derived, and the effects of some key variables, such as inflation rate, interest rate, and degree of intellectual property protection, on those thresholds were analyzed. With the help of our model and a numerical example of sewage treatment industry, we demonstrate that subsidy to both innovator and imitator reduces optimal investment thresholds, while subsidy only to innovator raises the investment thresholds rather than reducing them. Based on the results of our study, we suggest that the government should offer subsidy to both of innovator and imitator indiscriminately, raise the overall level of IP protection, and reduce the financial cost for private investors in order to motivate them to invest in PPP projects.