Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990-1999
Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990-1999
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衡量共谋的动机：维生素卡特尔，1990-1999
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2889837
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Takuo Sugaya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mitsuru Igami;Takuo Sugaya
为什么有些卡特尔能存活十年，而另一些卡特尔却在几年内崩溃？我们研究了近代史上最突出的案例之一，维生素卡特尔，以量化成员公司串通的动机。美国的法庭文件和欧洲的刑事调查提供了卡特尔组织的直接证据以及领先企业的内部成本数据，我们在一个标准的重复博弈框架内进行分析。初步结果表明，在1995年维生素C卡特尔实际崩溃时，卡特尔领导者的动机显着减少，主要是因为中国边缘竞争对手的供应增加，而β胡萝卜素，维生素A和维生素E的市场保持稳定。我们还发现，巴斯夫和武田在2001年的合并，如果在十年前完成，将延长维生素C卡特尔。
Why do some cartels survive for a decade but others collapse within a few years? We study one of the most prominent cases in recent history, the vitamin cartels, to quantify the member firms' incentives to collude. American court documents and European criminal investigation provide direct evidence on the cartels' organization as well as the leading firms' internal cost data, which we analyze within a standard repeated game framework. Preliminary results suggest the cartel leader's incentive diminished significantly at the time of the Vitamin C cartel's actual collapse in 1995, mainly because of growing supply from fringe competitors in China, whereas the markets for Beta Carotene, Vitamin A, and Vitamin E remained stable. We also find that the BASF-Takeda merger in 2001, if consummated a decade earlier, would have prolonged the Vitamin C cartel.
关于卡特尔的运作：来自挪威水泥行业的证据 â
DOI：
10.1257/000282806776157713
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
The American Economic Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
Röller;Lars-Hendrik;Frode Steen
通讯作者：
Frode Steen