Capacity Games in Assembly Systems with Uncertain Demand
Capacity Games in Assembly Systems with Uncertain Demand
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DOI：
10.1287/msom.5.3.252.16030
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发表时间：
2003-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yunzeng Wang;Y. Gerchak
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yunzeng Wang;Y. Gerchak
装配工需要一组部件，每个部件都由不同的供应商生产。为了生产零部件和组装最终产品，相关企业需要在观察实际需求之前建立各自的生产能力。这些公司有一个激励计划(合同)来引导“适当的”能力建设。合同的关键参数是装配商为其部件的单位向每个供应商支付的一组转移价格。关于如何确定合同条款，我们考虑了两个博弈设置。首先刻画了系统集中时的最优产能决策，然后求出了两种博弈环境下的分散均衡产能。结果表明，分散的信道性能在很大程度上依赖于系统的结构和参数。具体地说，在第一种设置下，性能随着装配者在全系统能力成本中的份额增加而提高，并且不受系统中供应商数量的影响，而在第二种设置下，性能在装配者在能力成本中的份额和在供应商数量上都降低。我们证明，当且仅当装配者的产能成本份额大于所涉及的公司数量的倒数时，第一种设置在系统性能方面主导第二种设置。
An assembler needs sets of components, each produced by a different supplier. To produce the components and assemble the final product, the firms involved need to construct their individual production capacities before observing the actual demand. The firms have an incentive scheme (contract) to induce a "proper" capacity build-up. The key parameters of the contract are the set oftransfer prices the assembler pays each supplier for a unit of its component. We consider two game settings as to how the terms of the contract are determined. The first is one where the assembler sets the prices, and the second is for the suppliers to simultaneously select the prices each wants to charge for its component.We first characterize the optimal capacity decision when the system is centralized, and then derive the decentralized equilibrium capacities under each of the two game settings. We show that the decentralized channel performances depend heavily on system structure/parameters. In particular, under the first setting, the performance improves as the assembler's share of the systemwide capacity cost increases and it is not affected by the number of suppliers in the system, while under the second setting, the performance degrades both in the assembler's share of capacity cost and in the number of suppliers. We show that the first setting dominates the second in terms of system performance if and only if the assembler's share of capacity cost is larger than the reciprocal of the number of firms involved.