‘A Drunken Consent is Still Consent’—Or is it? A Critical Analysis of the Law on a Drunken Consent to Sex following Bree
‘A Drunken Consent is Still Consent’—Or is it? A Critical Analysis of the Law on a Drunken Consent to Sex following Bree
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“醉酒同意仍然是同意”——或者是对布雷之后醉酒同意性行为的法律的批判性分析？
DOI：
10.1350/jcla.2009.73.4.582
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Shlomit Wallerstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shlomit Wallerstein
一个自愿醉酒的人仍然有能力对性行为给予有效的同意吗？布里上诉法院认为，“醉酒后的同意仍然是（有效的）同意”，尽管它进一步承认，同意的能力可能在申诉人失去知觉之前就消失了。这一决定是朝着正确的方向迈出的一步，但本文认为，它还不够远，而且，《2003年性犯罪法》第74条对这些情况进行了规定，允许甚至要求一个更激烈的解释：醉酒的同意不是当一个人喝醉时的同意。在区分事实上的同意和法律的同意的基础上，本条首先建立了第114条所述的法律的框架。74，并在Bree和H.然后，它继续批评目前的判例法及其对s的解释。74的限制不够，通过审查两个可能的理论依据，在判决中提到。第一种基于与醉酒罪犯有关的法律的类比，受到批评的理由是同意和意图之间的差异。第二种观点是基于这样一个一般性的论点，即这种立场承认性自主的积极方面，但它被批评没有区分规范性事实的主张和公共政策的主张，而且对后者的考虑给予了过多的重视。从讨论中，出现了另一种更具限制性的立场，与S一致。2003年法案第74条，根据该条，醉酒的同意不是同意。法官可以通过向陪审团提供更好的指导来采取这一立场，但如果做不到这一点，就可能需要对法律进行改革。
Does a person who is voluntarily drunk remain capable of giving valid consent to sex? The Court of Appeal in Bree held that ‘a drunken consent is still (valid) consent’, though it further recognises that the capacity to consent may evaporate well before a complainant becomes unconscious. This decision is a move in the right direction, yet this article argues that it has not gone far enough, and that s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which governs these scenarios allows—and even requires—a more drastic interpretation: a drunken consent is not consent when the person is very drunk. Based on a distinction between factual and legal consent, the article starts by setting up the legal framework as set out in s. 74, and developed in Bree and H. It then goes on to criticise the current case law and its interpretation of s. 74 for not being restrictive enough, by examining two possible theoretical rationales, mentioned in the judgments. The first, which is based on an analogy with the law relating to intoxicated offenders, is criticised on the grounds of differences between consent and intent. The second, which is based on the general argument that this position recognises the positive aspect of sexual autonomy, is criticised for its failure to distinguish between claims of normative facts and claims of public policy and for giving too much weight to the latter considerations. From the discussion an alternative, more restrictive position, emerges in line with s. 74 of the 2003 Act, according to which a drunken consent is not consent. This position can be adopted by judges, through the provision of better guidance to juries, but failing that a reform of the law might be needed.