Under the microscope: An experimental look at board transparency and director monitoring behavior
Under the microscope: An experimental look at board transparency and director monitoring behavior
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显微镜下：对董事会透明度和董事监控行为的实验观察
DOI：
10.1002/smj.2756
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
8.3
通讯作者：
Xu Yuehua
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Li Weiwen;Krause Ryan;Qin Xin;Zhang Junsheng;Zhu Hang;Lin Shanshan;Xu Yuehua
研究摘要：在公司治理研究中，独立董事对公司内部人的监督程度是不同的。这种差异很大程度上取决于独立董事更关心自己的公众声誉还是更关心自己在董事劳动力市场上的前景。然而，对这种差异的解释取决于信息不对称的假设。在本研究中，我们放松了信息不对称的假设，以考察董事会透明度如何影响董事的监督行为。通过对实际独立董事的随机实验研究，我们发现董事会的透明度放大了董事倾向于主动或被动监控的效果，倾向于警惕监控的董事会变得更加警惕，倾向于被动监控的董事会变得更加被动。管理层总结：在大多数发达经济体中，董事会的内部决策过程要么不公开，要么只在非常有限的程度上公开。因此，如果董事们的行为被公开，他们的行为是否会有所不同，这仍然是个未知数。我们发现，当他们的行为被披露给公众时，关心他们的公众声誉的董事会变得更加警惕，而那些关心他们的前景增加董事会席位的董事会变得更加被动，在监督公司内部人士。尽管监管机构和公司治理监督机构最近主张更多地披露董事会决策过程，但我们的研究表明，这种强制性披露要求可能会加剧而不是缓解董事被动监督的问题。
Research Summary:It is well known in corporate governance scholarship that independent directors differ in the vigilance with which they monitor corporate insiders. This difference depends largely on whether independent directors are concerned more with their public reputation or with their prospects in the director labor market. The explanation for this difference depends on an assumption of information asymmetry, however. In the present study, we relax the assumption of information asymmetry to examine how boardroom transparency affects directors’ monitoring behavior. Using a randomized experimental study of actual independent directors, we find that boardroom transparency amplifies the effect of directors’ inclinations toward either active or passive monitoring, with directors inclined toward vigilant monitoring becoming even more vigilant, and directors inclined toward passive monitoring becoming even more passive.Managerial Summary:In most advanced economies, the board's internal decision processes are either undisclosed or disclosed only to a very limited extent. It remains unknown, then, whether directors would behave differently if their behaviors were made public. We find that when their actions are disclosed to the public, directors concerned with their public reputations become more vigilant, whereas those concerned with their prospects for additional board seats become more passive in monitoring corporate insiders. Whereas regulatory bodies and corporate governance watchdogs have recently advocated for greater disclosure of the boardroom decision‐making process, our study suggests that such mandatory disclosure requirements can exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the problem of passive director monitoring.