The contribution of evidentials to utterance content: Evidence from the Basque reportative particle omen
The contribution of evidentials to utterance content: Evidence from the Basque reportative particle omen
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证据对话语内容的贡献：来自巴斯克报告助词预兆的证据
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
L. Zubeldia
中科院分区：
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作者：
Kepa Korta;L. Zubeldia
本工作的目的是为正式文献中关于证据性的两场辩论提供证据：(1)证据要件的证据内容是否在(某些)运算符的范围内；(2)证据内容是否可以直接被同意/拒绝或质疑。基于巴斯克语述语助词征兆的主要语义和语用特征，我们认为，证据内容一方面可以在特定的操作者中具有狭窄的范围，另一方面可以被拒绝(与跨语言发生的情况相反)。基于这些结论，我们认为，预兆的作用最好被解释为有助于话语的真值条件或命题内容，而不是有助于其言外之力或作为预设触发语。我们认为，通过使用征兆，说话者断言所报告的命题是由除他们自己以外的其他人陈述(或撰写)的。预兆没有其他的语义意义。在我们看来，说话人的不确定性表达通常被归因于预兆，如果它存在的话，属于话语的语用内容，更准确地说，是预兆话语的广义会话含义。Grice(1989a[1975]，1989b[1978])的可删除性测试和几个语料库的数据支持我们的结论。说话人的不确定性表达是明确的或在上下文中可以取消的，我们发现了许多例子，在这些例子中，说话人对所报告命题的真假的确定性是明确的。此外，受Korta&Perry 2011a的启发，我们区分了预兆话语中涉及的三个内容或真值条件集，相对于原始说话人的可能状态。此外，另一项测试(可以称为可报告性测试)的结果表明，说话人倾向于不使用预兆来报告非字面内容(至少是具体的会话含义和预设)。
The aim of the present work is to provide evidence for two debates in the formal literature on evidentiality (i) whether the evidential content of evidential elements is in the scope of (certain) operators, and (ii) whether the evidential content can be directly assented/rejected or challenged. We argue, based on the main semantic and pragmatic properties of the Basque reportative particle omen, that, on the one hand, evidential content can have narrow scope within certain operators, and, on the other hand, it can be rejected (contrary to what is claimed to happen crosslinguistically). Based on these conclusions, we contend that the role of omen is best interpreted as contributing to the truth conditions or the propositional content of the utterance, and not to its illocutionary force or as a presupposition trigger. We argue that, by using omen, speakers assert that the reported proposition has been stated (or written) by someone other than themselves. Omen has no other semantic meaning. In our view, the speaker’s expression of uncertainty often attributed to omen, if it is present, belongs to the pragmatic content of the utterance and, more precisely, is a generalized conversational implicature of the omen-utterance. Grice’s (1989a [1975], 1989b [1978]) cancelability ‘test’ and the data from several corpora support our conclusion. The speaker’s expression of uncertainty is explicitly or contextually cancelable, and we found many examples in which the speaker’s certainty about either the truth or falsity of the reported proposition is clear. In addition, inspired by Korta & Perry 2011a, we distinguish between three contents, or sets of truth conditions, involved in an omen-utterance, relative to the possible status of the original speaker. Moreover, the results of another test (which can be called the reportability test) show that speakers tend not to use omen to report nonliteral contents (particularized conversational implicatures and presuppositions, at least).